Nebraska sports betting group seeks tax cut for sportsbooks

Save Nebraska Sports coalition frames sportsbook tax relief as a corporate windfall

State Auditor Mike Foley stood in front of a room that had already made up its mind about the math. The coalition he helped found, Save Nebraska Sports, had a single argument to make against the November ballot measures: the money does not go where the proponents say it goes.

The ballot measures in question would allow up to twelve statewide mobile sportsbooks in Nebraska, with two licenses attached to each of the state's six gaming venues. If voters approve in November, the Nebraska Racing and Gaming Commission would have until June 1, 2027 to write the rules. The operators who spent over seven million dollars gathering signatures — DraftKings, FanDuel, Fanatics, BetMGM — would almost certainly be first through the licensing door.

Foley's argument is not that sports betting is immoral. His argument is that the revenue math in Tax Relief Nebraska's case is structured to obscure who captures the margin. His word was "pennies." The state would receive pennies while the large platforms absorb the commercially significant share of the handle. Joey Spellerberg, the state treasurer, has aligned with that position.

The people making the opposite case are not wrong that Nebraska has a budget problem. Property tax relief is a genuine pressure point, and the coalition backing the ballot measures has been disciplined about keeping that framing front and center. The question is whether a regulated sportsbook market in a mid-sized state actually delivers meaningful general revenue, or whether it delivers meaningful revenue to the operators, plus a number that looks large in a press release and small in a budget line.

The historical record on this is not encouraging for the optimists. States that have opened mobile sports betting markets have generally found that effective tax rates, after promotional deductions and the structural advantages operators write into licensing negotiations, produce less than the headline projections suggested. That gap is not unique to any single state. It recurs.

The reporting frames this as Foley versus FanDuel, which is the version of the story that fits a November ballot cycle. The more durable question is about the licensing structure itself: twelve licenses, two per venue, with no requirement that all twelve operate. That architecture concentrates market power at entry. A small number of well-capitalized national operators will take the available licenses, and the competitive dynamics that might otherwise pressure margins will not materialise in the way the tax revenue projections assume.

Foley is not wrong about the direction of the money. He may be wrong that blocking the ballot is the right response to it, since an unregulated market generates no tax revenue at all and leaves Nebraska consumers with worse consumer protection. But the coalition he leads has identified the real weakness in the proponents' case, and that weakness does not disappear because the operators have outspent them seven million dollars to zero on the signature drive.