Elliott Investment Management has filed a fresh lawsuit against the London Metal Exchange, this time under UK competition law — a pivot that tells you something about how much money it believes was erased on March 8, 2022.
That day, nickel prices moved from roughly $30,000 per metric ton to above $100,000 in hours. The LME suspended trading and then cancelled every trade executed that morning. The annulled transactions carried approximately $12 billion in notional value. Elliott, which had been on the winning side, originally sought around $456 million in damages through judicial review. The UK High Court rejected that claim in November 2023. The Court of Appeal upheld the rejection. The Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal in January 2025. AQR and DRW, which had filed parallel cases, withdrew after watching Elliott exhaust the route.
What Elliott is doing now is not persistence for its own sake. It is a different legal theory entirely. The first case argued the LME lacked authority to cancel trades. That argument failed at every level. The new case argues that what the LME did — and how it did it — violated UK competition rules. The distinction matters because competition claims carry their own procedural framework and their own remedies, and because the Financial Conduct Authority handed Elliott something useful in March 2025: a £9.2 million fine against the LME for its handling of the crisis. That was the FCA's first enforcement action against a UK exchange. Elliott has indicated it is reviewing those findings.
Here is where I part company with the straightforward reading of this story. The conventional view is that this is a long-shot afterthought — a hedge fund rummaging through the statute book after losing cleanly on the merits. I don't think that's where this lands. The FCA penalty establishes, on the public record, that the LME's conduct fell below the standard a regulator would accept. A competition claim does not need to re-litigate whether the cancellations were lawful. It needs to establish whether market power was exercised in a way that harmed participants who had no recourse. Those are different questions, and the courts that ruled in 2023 and 2024 did not answer them.
HKEX, which acquired the LME in 2012, is named as a co-defendant. Whatever the legal outcome, the exchange group is now carrying litigation exposure across multiple theories on a crisis that is four years old and still not resolved. That has a cost that doesn't appear on a balance sheet until it does.
I have watched institutions treat a first legal defeat as proof the claim was wrong. Sometimes it is. Sometimes it is proof the claim was wrong on that particular legal ground, and the underlying grievance is still alive. Elliott's original filing was not frivolous — it was resolved on a narrow point about LME authority, not on whether $456 million in legitimate trade profits were erased. The competition route keeps that underlying question open.
The London Metal Exchange holds authority under its rulebook to suspend trading during market disruptions and to cancel trades retroactively, which it exercised on March 8, 2022, when nickel prices spiked from roughly $30,000 to above $100,000 per metric ton in hours. The LME cancelled every trade executed that morning, annulling approximately $12 billion in notional value. UK courts upheld this authority in judicial review proceedings, rejecting Elliott Investment Management's challenge that the LME lacked the power to act.
Elliott's original judicial review argument—that the LME lacked authority to cancel trades—failed at the High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court between November 2023 and January 2025. The new competition claim does not re-litigate whether the cancellations were lawful but instead argues that the LME exercised market power in a way that harmed participants without recourse. The Financial Conduct Authority's £9.2 million fine against the LME in March 2025 for its handling of the crisis provided Elliott with regulatory findings that the LME's conduct fell below accepted standards.
HKEX, which acquired the LME in 2012, is named as co-defendant and now carries litigation exposure across multiple legal theories on a four-year-old crisis. Competition remedies differ from damages available under judicial review and could impose obligations or penalties beyond what previous courts considered. The unresolved litigation creates balance-sheet costs for the exchange group that remain contingent until final resolution.
The competition claim presents a narrower legal question than the failed judicial review—not whether cancellations were authorized, but whether market power was abused—which changes the evidentiary burden and precedent available to courts. The FCA's enforcement finding creates a public regulatory record that competition courts can reference without relitigating the underlying trade suspension. Polymarket and similar platforms would need to isolate the probability of a competition court accepting Elliott's theory as distinct from the certainty of its judicial review loss.