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Cantor enters prediction markets as institutional money tests the model

Luana Lopes Lara told the room that CME might want to examine its staffing ratios.

Eleanor Ashworth Senior Markets Analyst ·3 min read ·2 sources

Terry Duffy made the manipulation argument. Vlad Tenev seconded it. Luana Lopes Lara told the room that CME might want to examine its staffing ratios. And while the CFTC's Innovation Advisory Committee was absorbing that exchange, Cantor Fitzgerald was elsewhere arranging something quieter and more consequential: a formal route for institutional capital into the event contract market.

Cantor's move is to act as introducing broker for block trades on Kalshi, with Susquehanna Predictions handling pricing and liquidity on the other side. The structure is straightforward. What it signals is less so.

Institutional block trading does not happen in markets regulators are preparing to shut down. The arrangement assumes Kalshi survives Nevada, survives the mention market review, survives the preemption cases working through several federal courts simultaneously. Cantor's compliance team made that call. Susquehanna's risk desk made it too. Two firms with entirely different business models and entirely different appetites for regulatory exposure both looked at the same legal landscape and decided to build infrastructure in it.

The consensus view from this week's CFTC roundtable is that mention markets are the vulnerability and self-certification is the process question. Both framings are correct, and both are also convenient for incumbents. Duffy's observation that 2,500 self-certifications have passed without a single agency objection is worth sitting with — not because it proves manipulation runs unchecked, but because it describes a system where the regulator has effectively outsourced the threshold question to the platforms. Selig's roadmap addresses this, in the way regulatory roadmaps address things: sequentially, with timelines that report to no one.

The piece the roundtable did not settle is what institutional entry does to the manipulation calculus. The worry about mention markets is that a determined trader can move a small, thin contract by influencing what a speaker says — or by knowing in advance. Block trading from institutions with compliance infrastructure is a different problem. Not a smaller one. When the position sizes get larger, the incentive to engineer the outcome scales with them. Duffy's manipulation concern was directed at retail-sized contracts on speech events. The question his argument did not reach is whether institutional liquidity in larger, more legitimate contracts creates its own set of information asymmetry problems.

I have watched institutional entry reframe a market's legitimacy before being able to police it. The entry itself becomes the argument for lighter review, because serious money has self-selected in and therefore the market must be serious. That logic runs only in one direction and stops before it reaches the question of what the serious money knows.

Cantor and Susquehanna are not wrong to move. The legal trajectory, across four states and two federal circuit courts, points toward federal preemption holding. The CFTC's roadmap, whatever its pace, describes a commission that intends to regulate this market rather than prohibit it. The institutional architecture being built this week is built on that read, and that read is defensible.

The self-certification gap Duffy identified is real. Selig knows it. The roadmap addresses it on a schedule the market will not wait for. What Cantor's arrival makes clear is that the infrastructure question has already moved past the regulatory debate — and the CFTC is now writing rules for a market that has already decided it exists.

About the analyst
Senior Markets Analyst

Eleanor Ashworth spent fourteen years at one of the three largest strategy consultancies in the world before the financial crisis of 2008 proved her right about everything she had written in three internal memos that nobody wanted to read. She was not one of the people who was wrong.

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Cantor Fitzgerald acts as an introducing broker for block trades on Kalshi, with Susquehanna Predictions handling pricing and liquidity provision. This structure allows institutional investors to execute larger position sizes through compliance-vetted intermediaries rather than trading retail contracts directly on the platform.

Cantor's compliance team and Susquehanna's risk desk both concluded that Kalshi's legal trajectory across multiple federal courts and Nevada regulation suggested survival was probable enough to warrant institutional entry. The arrangement assumes Kalshi survives the preemption cases currently working through several federal courts simultaneously, signaling confidence in the regulatory outcome.

When position sizes grow larger through institutional block trading, the incentive to engineer outcomes scales proportionally with them. Institutional liquidity in larger contracts creates information asymmetry problems beyond the retail speech-event manipulation that CFTC observers focused on—a risk Duffy's argument did not address.

Institutional self-selection into a market becomes the argument for lighter regulatory review, under the logic that serious money would not enter if the market were not legitimate. This framing runs in one direction only and stops before asking what information advantages the serious institutional money actually possesses.