When the Senate Commerce Committee moved the Clarity Act out of committee, the bill's sponsors described it as a framework for resolving the jurisdictional dispute between state gambling regulators and CFTC-regulated prediction markets. What it does not resolve — and what the NFL's second formal letter to Kalshi and Polymarket has now made concrete — is whether federal preemption protects a contract category that a private league, not a state regulator, wants removed.
That distinction matters more than most of the commentary this week has acknowledged.
The NFL's compliance chief Sabrina Perel sent her letter Thursday, one week before the regular season opens. The letter is the league's second formal demand in 2026. The first, sent in spring, identified the same contract categories: player injury status, fan safety, player misconduct, officiating decisions, broadcast mentions, celebrity attendance. The second letter makes clear those contracts are still being listed. What is new is the specificity — Perel named individual play types, including whether a kicker misses a field goal and whether a running back gains fewer than a specified number of yards on his first carry. That granularity is not incidental. It is the predicate for the argument the league has not yet made in court but is building toward: that these contracts are individually susceptible to single-actor manipulation, which is a different legal exposure than general gambling prohibition.
The Commodity Exchange Act prohibits contracts susceptible to manipulation. That is the standard under 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3), and it applies to designated contract markets whether or not a state or private party complains. The CFTC's own rules require exchanges to demonstrate that listed contracts are not readily susceptible to manipulation — the obligation runs to the Commission, not to the league. But a well-documented, repeated assertion by the entity whose operations underlie the contracts, specifying which contract types and why, creates a record. Regulators read records.
The Clarity Act, if enacted as drafted, would ratify federal jurisdiction over event contracts and likely displace the state-level enforcement actions New Jersey, Michigan, and Missouri are pursuing through different legal theories. It would not, however, immunize contracts that fail the manipulation-susceptibility test. A CFTC designation does not override Section 5(d) of the CEA. Preemption settles the state question. It does not settle the federal one.
I have seen this pattern before in derivatives markets — not in sports, but in commodity markets where the underlying was thin enough that a single participant could move it. The legal issue in those cases was never whether manipulation had occurred. It was whether the contract design made manipulation foreseeable. Foreseeability, in that context, is a design defect, not a conduct question. Perel's letter, whether or not the NFL intends it this way, is assembling exactly that record on first-carry and first-pass contracts.
The prediction market operators have a response available: that the contract population is large enough, and participant behavior diverse enough, that no single actor can reliably move an outcome. That argument works for game-winner contracts. For whether a specific player's first individual action in a specific game meets a specific threshold, it is a harder case to make, and the exchanges have not yet made it in a forum where it will be tested.
The Commodity Exchange Act prohibits contracts susceptible to manipulation under 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(3), a standard that applies to all designated contract markets. The CFTC's rules require exchanges to demonstrate that listed contracts are not readily susceptible to manipulation, with that obligation running to the Commission itself rather than to private parties. This manipulation-susceptibility test is the primary federal constraint on contract design.
Sabrina Perel's second letter, sent one week before the NFL regular season, named player injury status, fan safety, player misconduct, officiating decisions, broadcast mentions, and celebrity attendance as prohibited contract categories. The letter specified individual play types including whether a kicker misses a field goal or whether a running back gains fewer than a specified number of yards on his first carry, establishing a detailed record of the league's objections.
The Clarity Act, if enacted as drafted, would ratify federal jurisdiction over event contracts and likely displace state-level enforcement actions from New Jersey, Michigan, and Missouri. However, enactment would not immunize contracts that fail the manipulation-susceptibility test under Section 5(d) of the CEA. Federal preemption would settle the state enforcement question while leaving the federal manipulation standard unresolved.
The CFTC evaluates contract designs against the manipulation-susceptibility standard, and a well-documented record of objections from the entity whose operations underlie the contracts strengthens the evidentiary basis for that evaluation. Regulators use repeated, specific assertions identifying which contract types carry foreseeable manipulation risk as evidence of design defects, a pattern established in commodity derivatives cases involving thin underlying markets.