Abigail Pace, Nevada's Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief with the Ninth Circuit on Thursday that doesn't attack Kalshi's regulatory theory head-on. It lets Kalshi's own conduct do the work instead.
Her argument is straightforward: when North Carolina's governor signed Senate Bill 257 into law and Kalshi accepted the terms — including a six percent tax on trading fee revenue attributable to state residents — Kalshi implicitly conceded that a state can reach into its operations and extract something. If a state can tax the revenue, Nevada argues, the logic that a state cannot regulate the conduct producing that revenue becomes very hard to sustain.
The elegance of the move is that it uses Kalshi's pragmatism against Kalshi's litigation strategy. North Carolina offered a reasonably clean deal: federal oversight codified in state law, no separate gaming licence, a tax rate that looks modest against the twenty-three percent sports-betting operators face. Kalshi accepted, which was commercially sensible. But every commercial concession in a live legal dispute has a cost, and Pace just sent the invoice.
Kalshi's counter-position — that there is a meaningful distinction between a state taxing revenue and a state regulating contracts — is not frivolous. Tax law and regulatory law are distinct bodies with distinct constitutional footings. I have watched structurally similar arguments succeed in other contexts. But the Ninth Circuit is not being asked to rule on tax law in the abstract. It is being asked whether field preemption under the Commodity Exchange Act leaves room for states to act at all. Nevada's filing says that North Carolina already acted in exactly that field, and Kalshi said yes. That is a harder position to walk back than a purely theoretical brief would have been.
Illinois complicates the picture further. The tiered transaction tax imposed under Senate Bill 3019, which Kalshi has sued to overturn, creates a direct contradiction with its North Carolina posture. Kalshi accepted state-level revenue extraction in one jurisdiction and litigated against it in another. Both cases are live. Pace will not be the last attorney to point at the gap between them.
The core preemption question — whether CFTC oversight of designated contract markets displaces state authority entirely — was always going to be decided on the structural reading of the Commodity Exchange Act, not on Kalshi's commercial choices. But courts weigh consistency, and a company that argues uniform federal regulation in San Francisco while paying a state tax in Raleigh is not arguing from a consistent position.
I have been wrong before about how much litigation posture matters relative to statutory text. My instinct here is that Nevada's filing doesn't win the Ninth Circuit case on its own, but it narrows the ground Kalshi can stand on when the panel gets to field preemption. The brief is a constraint, not a knockout. The practical effect is that Kalshi now has to distinguish North Carolina affirmatively, in front of judges who will notice if the distinction is thin.
The Commodity Exchange Act grants the CFTC oversight of designated contract markets, and the question before the Ninth Circuit is whether that federal authority entirely displaces state-level regulation or leaves room for parallel state action. The core issue is whether CFTC designation creates field preemption that prevents states from taxing or regulating the conduct producing trading revenue. This structural reading of the statute, not commercial negotiations, will ultimately decide whether states can act in this space at all.
North Carolina's Senate Bill 257 imposes a six percent tax on trading fee revenue attributable to state residents, which Kalshi accepted when the governor signed the law into effect. Nevada's Deputy Attorney General Abigail Pace argues that Kalshi's acceptance of state-level revenue extraction in North Carolina undermines Kalshi's position that states cannot regulate the conduct producing that revenue. The inconsistency between accepting North Carolina's tax and litigating against Illinois's tiered transaction tax under Senate Bill 3019 exposes Kalshi to the argument that it cannot claim uniform federal preemption while paying state taxes elsewhere.
Kalshi's litigation posture becomes internally inconsistent: the company accepts state-level revenue extraction in North Carolina while arguing for complete federal preemption in Nevada and Illinois. Courts weigh consistency in structural statutory interpretation, meaning a company that argues for uniform federal regulation in San Francisco while paying a state tax in Raleigh cannot sustain that position credibly. Nevada's brief constrains the ground Kalshi can occupy when the Ninth Circuit reaches the field preemption question, even if the brief does not resolve the statutory issue on its own.
On platforms like Polymarket or other event-based derivatives exchanges, traders would discount Kalshi's win probability in the Nevada preemption case to reflect the company's inability to sustain a consistent argument across multiple jurisdictions. The contradiction between North Carolina acceptance and Illinois litigation creates path dependency: if Kalshi loses to Nevada, traders would expect similar outcomes in other circuits where state taxation or regulation is challenged. The internal inconsistency in Kalshi's commercial conduct becomes information that prediction market participants can price directly into their odds on the Ninth Circuit ruling.