A survey of prediction market users published this week found that seventy-nine percent reported net losses. The platforms running those markets are growing faster than at any point in their short history.
Hold both of those facts at the same time, because the tension between them is where the real story lives.
The loss figure drew some coverage as an indictment — look at these new products eating retail money. That reading is too simple. Every serious study of retail options trading, retail forex, retail crypto has found the same distribution: a large majority lose, a small minority win consistently, and the platforms collect fees from both groups regardless. Prediction markets are not unusual here. They are behaving exactly like every other market structure that opened to retail participation before the infrastructure caught up with the ambition.
What I find more interesting is the timing of the survey relative to everything else happening in this sector right now. The CFTC is in the middle of a rulemaking process serious enough to reach the White House. The Czech Republic just ordered ISPs to block Kalshi within fifteen days of a Ministry of Finance prohibition order. Tennessee handed state regulators a significant court win. New York has sued Polymarket. And through all of it, volume is up — NFL contract trading on Kalshi surged even as the platform ended its volume rewards programme, which means organic demand replaced an incentive structure rather than collapsing without it.
That last point is where I part from the consensus read. The retail loss data will be used by opponents — casino industry lawyers, state attorneys general, European regulators — as evidence that these platforms are functionally gambling operations dressed in financial language. Bill Miller made exactly this argument at G2E. The Fluharty camp has been making it for months. If seventy-nine percent of users lose money, the argument goes, the social utility claim falls apart.
I don't think that argument lands where its proponents expect. Regulatory bodies that distinguish between consumer protection failures and product illegality will treat a high retail loss rate as a disclosure problem, not a prohibition case. The CFTC's current rulemaking trajectory suggests it is trying to draw exactly this line — between contracts that require better labelling and contracts that cannot be offered at all. A survey showing most users lose is data for the first category, not automatic grounds for the second.
The European picture is different. The Czech block on Kalshi, coming through gambling law rather than financial regulation, reflects a jurisdictional framing that several EU member states appear to share. Under that framing the retail loss data is not a disclosure gap — it is confirmation that the product is a gambling instrument operating without a gambling licence. Kalshi's legal team will contest this, but contesting it in each jurisdiction separately is expensive and slow, and the Czech decision creates a template others can follow without needing to construct their own legal reasoning from scratch.
The survey finding that will be ignored in most of the coverage is what the losing seventy-nine percent were actually trading. If the losses concentrate in short-term political contracts — the kind that resolve in days and carry very high rake — that is a different regulatory conversation than losses spread across longer-dated economic contracts where information advantage is more plausible. The survey, as reported, does not break this down. That absence is itself a data point about how immature the public understanding of this sector still is.
Prediction markets function as platforms where retail users trade contracts on event outcomes, collecting fees from both winning and losing participants regardless of individual results. The platforms operate under a market structure similar to options trading, forex, and crypto exchanges, where a large majority of retail participants lose money while a small minority trade profitably. Volume on major platforms like Kalshi has grown significantly even as incentive structures changed, indicating sustained organic demand from retail users.
The Czech Ministry of Finance ordered ISPs to block Kalshi within fifteen days using gambling law authority rather than financial regulation frameworks. This jurisdictional framing reflects how several EU member states categorize prediction markets as gambling instruments operating without gambling licenses, rather than as financial products requiring disclosure improvements. The distinction matters because it moves the question from regulatory oversight to product prohibition.
The CFTC's current rulemaking trajectory distinguishes between contracts requiring better labeling and contracts that cannot be offered at all, treating high retail loss rates as a disclosure problem rather than automatic grounds for prohibition. However, EU member states operating under gambling law frameworks may use the seventy-nine percent user loss figure as confirmation that platforms operate without proper gambling licenses, creating divergent regulatory outcomes across jurisdictions and threatening platform operations in Europe specifically.
NFL contract trading volume on Kalshi surged even after the platform ended its volume rewards program, demonstrating that organic demand persisted without artificial incentives despite concurrent regulatory challenges from the CFTC rulemaking process, state court wins in Tennessee, lawsuits in New York, and international blocking orders. This volume behavior signals market participant conviction about platform legitimacy independent of regulatory outcomes, providing data that prediction markets platforms and their users can reference in ongoing regulatory proceedings.