Texas Republicans weigh state lawsuit against federally licensed prediction markets
Senator Bryan Hughes opened the Texas Senate Committee on State Affairs to a question his chamber has circled twice before without answering: whether a state that has declined to authorize sports betting can do anything about federally regulated platforms that have brought it anyway. The hearing was formally about study, preparation for the session beginning January 12. In practice, it was a room of people deciding how angry to get.
The American Gaming Association's Tres York gave them a direction. Sue in state court. Treat sports event contracts as illegal gambling under existing Texas law. His underlying argument was a win rate: states have prevailed in 36 of 42 combined state and federal rulings so far. That number carries weight in a statehouse. It also deserves scrutiny, because the cases where states lost tend to be the ones with federal preemption at their center, which is precisely where Kalshi operates.
Kalshi's head of enforcement and legal counsel, Robert DeNault, offered the committee a different frame. Ban us and your residents go offshore to something less regulated. Accept us and negotiate advertising limits, risk disclosures, protections for younger users. This is a reasonable argument and also a negotiating position, and it is worth holding both things at once.
What struck me about the hearing's record, reading it straight, is that neither side addressed the structural question that actually matters here. York's litigation strategy depends on state courts being willing to rule that CFTC-regulated event contracts are illegal gambling under Texas law — a position that puts state courts in direct conflict with a federal regulatory determination. That is not impossible. It is the posture Connecticut has taken. But Connecticut is now fighting the CFTC in federal court, not winning in state court, and the outcome of that fight is not settled.
The insider trading point raised by Jonathan Covey of Texas Values was analytically interesting in a way the room appeared to miss. He noted that Kalshi's detection of insider trading was favorable evidence for the company — and simultaneously evidence that politically sensitive, non-public information was being monetized on the platform. That double-edged reading is correct. A market that catches insider trading is functioning. A market where insider trading is worth attempting tells you something about information asymmetry in the underlying contracts. Those two facts coexist.
Texas has refused gambling expansion in two consecutive sessions. The legislature's posture has been consistent. What has changed is that the expansion arrived without legislative approval, through a federal regulatory framework the state did not anticipate and cannot directly override. Hughes framed this as exploitation of federal law. DeNault framed it as federal law operating as designed. The distance between those framings is where litigation lives.
The consensus read is that Texas will sue, courts will split, and the question eventually reaches the same federal track Connecticut is already on. I don't think that's quite where this lands. The AGA's 36-of-42 figure is the tell. If state-court litigation were reliably failing, York wouldn't be recommending it. The cases where states have won are worth examining before the next session opens in January.
Prediction markets like Kalshi operate under CFTC regulation as event contracts rather than gambling, which places them under federal regulatory authority. States like Texas that have declined to authorize sports betting cannot directly override the CFTC's licensing decision, even though the platforms function similarly to wagering in practice. This creates a structural gap where federal law operates in jurisdictions where state law would prohibit the same activity.
Jonathan Covey of Texas Values raised that Kalshi's detection of insider trading was simultaneously favorable evidence of market functioning and evidence that politically sensitive, non-public information was being monetized on the platform. The ability to catch insider trading indicates the market works; the fact that insider trading is worth attempting indicates information asymmetry in the underlying contracts. Both observations are analytically correct and cut different directions on whether the platform should operate.
Kalshi's head of legal counsel Robert DeNault argued that banning the platform would push Texas residents to offshore, less-regulated alternatives rather than eliminating participation. The company offered negotiation over advertising limits, risk disclosures, and protections for younger users as an alternative to prohibition. This positions acceptance and regulation as preferable to driving the activity to unregulated jurisdictions.
The American Gaming Association's litigation strategy depends on Texas courts ruling that CFTC-regulated event contracts are illegal gambling under state law, which would put state courts in direct conflict with federal regulatory determination. Connecticut pursued this posture but is now fighting the CFTC in federal court rather than winning in state court, with outcomes unsettled. The cases where states have lost gambling litigation tend to involve federal preemption at their center, precisely where Kalshi's CFTC license operates.