Jeremy Levine had a choice to make before the NFL season opened, and he made both halves of it on the same day. Underdog surrendered its daily fantasy sports licences in seven states and filed federal lawsuits in five others, asking courts to declare that state gambling laws cannot touch a CFTC-designated contract market. The DFS business — the one that required state-by-state licensing, that lived inside the regulatory framework the states control — went out the door. The prediction market business filed for a constitutional shield.
The lawsuits landed in Ohio, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, New Mexico, and Washington. Every one of those states is already in litigation with Kalshi, the CFTC, or both. Stacie Stern, Underdog's senior vice president of government affairs, was direct about what Levine's company actually wants from these filings: not settlement, not negotiation, but a Supreme Court ruling that settles whether there is one federal standard or fifty state ones. The five states weren't chosen at random — they were chosen because the legal ground there is already broken and contested, which means any injunction Underdog wins accelerates the timeline toward that national answer.
This is where I part company with the consensus read on what Underdog is doing. The coverage treats the DFS licence surrenders as a retreat and the lawsuits as a gamble. I think the framing is backwards. Levine is running a platform that can only scale under federal preemption, and holding DFS licences in states that are actively trying to regulate prediction markets as gambling created a liability — not a commercial one, but a legal one. A company that holds a state gaming licence has implicitly acknowledged that the state has jurisdiction over its activities. Surrendering those licences and immediately filing preemption suits is a cleaner legal posture than the one Kalshi has been arguing from. Kalshi applied for state licences in some jurisdictions. Underdog is refusing to.
The Illinois angle makes this sharper. Republican Representative Travis Weaver has introduced a bill that would repeal the tiered transaction tax Illinois imposed on exchange wagers — a tax set at 1.75% on the first five million contracts and 3.5% above that — and strip the definition of "exchange wager" from the Sports Wagering Act entirely. Weaver's own framing is instructive: he wants to kill the tax before it starts generating revenue, because once it does, it becomes politically durable. A tax that funds state budgets is a tax that survives court challenges even when the underlying legal theory is weak.
The 10th Circuit's denial of Kalshi's injunction in Utah tells you something about how this plays in the lower courts. Kalshi has now lost injunctive relief in multiple jurisdictions, and each denial runs the same reasoning — the platform hasn't demonstrated likelihood of success on the merits strongly enough to suspend state enforcement while the appeal proceeds. The courts are not saying Kalshi is wrong on the law. They are saying the case is unresolved, and unresolved cases don't get injunctions. Underdog's lawyers have watched every one of those rulings. Filing preemption suits before any state enforcement action begins — rather than in response to one — is a deliberate attempt to control the procedural sequence. Whether it works depends on whether federal district courts in Ohio and Massachusetts read the Supremacy Clause argument differently than the courts hearing Kalshi's appeals. There is no particular reason to assume they will.
The CFTC designates certain platforms as contract markets under federal commodities law, which Underdog and Kalshi argue creates federal preemption over state gambling jurisdiction. Prediction market operators contend this federal designation means state gaming laws cannot regulate their activities, but this legal theory remains untested at the Supreme Court level. The constitutional question hinges on whether federal commodities regulation displaces state authority entirely or whether states retain concurrent power to enforce gambling restrictions.
Underdog surrendered daily fantasy sports licenses because holding state gaming licenses implicitly acknowledges state jurisdiction over those activities, which would contradict its legal argument that prediction markets fall under exclusive federal authority. By abandoning DFS entirely and refusing new state licenses while filing preemption suits in Ohio, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, New Mexico, and Washington, Underdog presents a cleaner constitutional posture than competitors like Kalshi, which sought state licensing in some jurisdictions. This tactical split allows Underdog to argue it operates solely as a federally-regulated platform with no state licensing consent.
If states retain authority over prediction markets, Underdog would face the same state-by-state licensing requirements and regulatory burdens that forced it to abandon its daily fantasy sports operation. Prediction market platforms cannot scale nationally under fifty separate regulatory regimes, making federal preemption existentially necessary for Underdog's long-term viability. The platform's entire business strategy depends on winning Supreme Court-level validation that the CFTC designation preempts state gambling laws entirely.
Underdog and Kalshi operate as CFTC-designated contract markets where traders buy and sell shares tied to event outcomes, with prices reflecting real-time probability assessments. These platforms function similarly to prediction markets on Polymarket and other decentralized exchanges, though Underdog and Kalshi operate under explicit federal regulatory oversight. The resolution of prediction market contracts depends on the underlying events occurring—such as election results or sports outcomes—rather than on the jurisdictional lawsuits themselves, though regulatory uncertainty affects trading volume and liquidity across all platforms.