Judge Julia Smith Gibbons had two ways to rule against Kalshi, and she used both of them.
The Sixth Circuit's unanimous opinion, handed down by a three-judge panel in Cincinnati, first found that Kalshi's sports-event contracts do not meet the statutory definition of a swap under the Commodity Exchange Act. Then, in the alternative, it found that even if they did qualify as swaps, the CEA would still not preempt Ohio and Tennessee gambling law. Two independent grounds, one outcome: states may regulate these contracts under their own gambling statutes.
Gibbons was direct about the underlying logic. Swaps exist to hedge financial risk — they reference rates, indices, instruments. Working out the probability that a soccer match produces a certain number of corner kicks, or that a thirty-leg parlay connects, does not serve that function. Gambling regulation, she wrote, lies at the heart of state police power, and Congress has consistently left states as the primary authority on what forms of gambling may operate within their borders.
The practical consequence is that Tennessee's preliminary injunction — which had blocked state enforcement against Kalshi — is now vacated. Ohio's denial of a similar injunction is upheld. Kalshi is exposed in both states.
What makes this more than a pair of state losses is the circuit map. The Ninth Circuit has already ruled that Nevada can treat Kalshi's contracts as gambling. The Sixth has now reached the same conclusion for Ohio and Tennessee. The Third Circuit went the other way in April, finding that Kalshi's contracts fell within CFTC exclusive jurisdiction, which prompted New Jersey to petition the Supreme Court. Three circuits, two conflicting answers, and the question of whether the Court intervenes now or waits for the map to fill in further is genuinely open.
I have watched Kalshi's legal team make this argument across multiple jurisdictions, and the swap framing has always been the thinner of their two claims. The preemption argument — that the CEA simply crowds out state authority wherever it operates — was always the one worth watching. Gibbons addressed it as a secondary holding, which means it carries less precedential weight on its own, but it is still a circuit court telling Kalshi that preemption does not save them even when the swap question is assumed in their favour. That is a more damaging ruling than the headline loss rate suggests.
The Supreme Court now faces a circuit split with a clear geography. Sports-contract prediction markets are lawful federal derivatives in the Third Circuit's territory and regulated gambling in the Sixth and Ninth. An operator cannot function coherently under that map, which is precisely the kind of conflict the Court exists to resolve. Whether the justices take New Jersey's petition, wait for Kalshi to file its own, or let further appellate decisions accumulate before granting certiorari is the question that now governs Kalshi's medium-term position in the United States market.
Under the Commodity Exchange Act, swaps are derivatives that hedge financial risk by referencing rates, indices, or financial instruments. Judge Julia Smith Gibbons ruled in the Sixth Circuit that Kalshi's sports-event contracts—which reference outcomes like corner kicks in soccer matches or parlay results—do not serve a hedging function and therefore do not qualify as swaps under the CEA's statutory definition. Gambling regulation, not financial hedging, was the true purpose of these contracts.
The Sixth Circuit's unanimous three-judge panel found that gambling regulation lies at the heart of state police power and that Congress has consistently left states as the primary authority over what forms of gambling may operate within their borders. Judge Gibbons held this position both as the primary ground and as an alternative ruling—even if Kalshi's contracts qualified as swaps, the CEA would still not preempt state gambling statutes. This dual holding means states retain independent authority to regulate Kalshi's contracts.
Tennessee's preliminary injunction blocking state enforcement against Kalshi is now vacated, while Ohio's denial of a similar injunction is upheld. Kalshi is therefore exposed to enforcement action in both states under their gambling laws. The practical effect is that state regulators in Ohio and Tennessee can now proceed with regulation of Kalshi's sports-event contracts as gambling products rather than federally exempt derivatives.
The Ninth Circuit, Sixth Circuit, and Third Circuit have reached conflicting conclusions: the Third Circuit found Kalshi's contracts fall within CFTC exclusive jurisdiction, while the Ninth and Sixth Circuits permit state gambling regulation. This geographic split means Kalshi cannot operate coherently across the United States under incompatible regulatory regimes. New Jersey has already petitioned the Supreme Court, and the justices must decide whether to grant certiorari now or wait for further appellate decisions before resolving the conflict.